Lessons Learned from the Iraq War

From the Strategy Page

Summary:

• No M-1 Abrams were taken out by direct enemy contact. Though some were destroyed by American forces to prevent disabled equipment from being captured.
  
• In a friendly fire incident, depleted uranium shells from a Bradley Fighting Vehicle penetrated the engine compartment of an M-1, but didn't penetrate to the crew area.
  
• The most useful weapons on an Abrams on an urban battlefield are the machine guns.
  
• As Alexander the Great learned, an Army is only as good as it's supply system. The initial attacks outpaced the supply line quickly. New armored supply vehicles need to be developed as the thin skinned HMMWV's and 5 ton trucks are vulnerable to ambush. During Desert Storm, the biggest concern for supply vehicles was not running over Iraqis wishing to surrender.
  
• The aircraft carrier deployment system will be revamped to be able to surge many more carrier groups to hot spots in the future.
  
• With Net Centric Warfare US units communicate much better, but that doesn't translate well in mountainous or jungle terrain. More satellites need to be launched to increase communications ability as the Information Age has reached the battlefield.
  
• Snipers. This skill is being used at lower levels. In WWII, snipers were usually attached at the company level. Now, each squad should have a designated sniper, even if he hasn't gone to an official sniper course, but just has a natural shooting skill. Weapons training is critical in close combat situations.
  
• KC-135 fueling aircraft usually loiter over a battlefield. Each has been retrofitted to be another node in the Net Centric web linking up aircraft that cannot communicate directly with ground units due to line-of-site communication technology.
  
• Infantry Training. When I was in, the motto was train as you would fight. The goal was to make the training as realistic as possible, maybe even more difficult than an actual battlefield. The problem is that that goal isn't always achieved. Troops on the ground are calling for more realistic training once they get home.
  
• Mob control tactics that worked well in the Balkins, work well in Iraq. Identify the leaders/agitators/most vocal and engage them in talk if possible or tackle them if not. A helocopter hovering over a crowd in a dusty environment does wonders.
  
• Highly concentrated air-to-ground bombing and strafing deflate moral and lead to desertion in poorly trained and led troops.
  
• Local interpreters need to be attached to every squad or every platoon, at a minimum.
  
• A surprise to me is that the new Interceptor vest is indeed bullet proof for military rounds. Older vests were not. At 16 pounds, it's still heavy though. It's a classic trade off, speed for armor. My long range survellance experience tell me that speed and stealth are superior, but I've never had to operate in an urban warfare environment.
  
• The springs in the Barreta 9mm are still weak and prone to failure.
  
• Identifying your friends. Thanks to cell phone technology, most units were given a unit that broadcasted a GPS signal. Unit commanders could identify friendly units on-screen and deploy them much more easily. A side benefit is that each unit could text message to each other, increasing the level of communication.
  
• The Iraq War was too fast moving for division command. Brigade and battalion commanders assumed much more battlefield control aided by Internet and cell phone technology.